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Tolokonnikova on Friday appealed against an April district court ruling not to grant her parole, arguing that the hearing had been marred by procedural violations. But the district court ruling was upheld by the Supreme Court in the republic of Mordovia, the Russian province known for its grim network of penal colonies where Tolokonnikova is imprisoned.
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Both last year and the year before, Rhode Island ranked dead last in the cable TV business-news networkâ?™s annual survey of the best places to do business, results that helped spur state officials to make regulatory changes aimed at moving Rhode Island up in the CNBC list and other similar business rankings.
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"There's really no criminal element to any of it," Martos said. "From mom's standpoint, there's nothing to indicate any neglect or abuse. From the kid's point, he's 8 years old so his mental state is not culpable."
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Goodman is the cash broker, based in London, who called himself Lord Libor. Every day, he would send an email to the various banks which contributed to the daily Libor fixing, giving them “suggested Libors” for where they should report yen Libor at 1-month, 3-month, and 6-month tenors. Not all of the banks would follow Goodman’s suggestion all of the time. But most of them would take Goodman’s email as an important datapoint, and some of them would simply turn around and submit whatever Goodman told them the rate was. After all, yen Libor was, especially during the financial crisis, something of a fiction: it’s meant to represent the rate at which banks lend to each other in yen, but by the time of the crisis, there was exactly zero interbank yen lending going on. So yen Libor became simply whatever the banks said that it was — a recipe for manipulation.